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MARKETS AND STATES IN 
DEVELOPMENT 
India's Reformers and the 
East Asian Experience 
Shalendra D. Sharma 
In his inimitable manner, Manmohan Singh, India's 
self-effacing finance minister, is fond of rhetorically asking: "What does 
South Korea have that India doesn't?" or "Why have we [India] been 
marginalized if in 1960, South Korea and India had roughly the same per 
capita income ... but today Korea has a strong economy and our economy 
faces severe problems?"1 Such hard, self-searching questions are at the 
heart of the current debate on economic reform-"liberalization"-in In- 
dia. In spite of the fact that both these countries faced similar economic 
problems and developmental challenges in the 1950s, South Korea in a 
span of some two decades has transformed itself into the proverbial Asian 
"tiger"-aggressive, sleek, and confident-while India after four decades 
of state-guided or "planned development" has continued to lag behind as 
the lame elephant-immense, lethargic, and seemingly lumbering into ob- 
scurity. 
Singh's frequent reference to the divergent macroeconomic performance 
of these two countries is no accident. Repeatedly comparing South Korea, 
the paradigmatic East Asian success story, with the crisis-ridden and eco- 
nomically troubled Indian subcontingent, and unequivocally declaring that 
his government's economic policies make an explicit break with the failed 
dirigiste policies of the past is not only designed to illustrate the shortcom- 
ings of the Indian model of development but is also a calculated political 
move. The comparison forcefully underscores the significance of the gov- 
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1. Economist, May 23, 1991, p. 21, and India Today, July 31, 1991, pp. 24-25. 
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emnment's economic liberalization programs and is intended to pull the rug 
out from under the feet of critics who accuse the government, and the 
finance minister in particular, for "selling out India's sovereignty" to the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
While the Indian government's economic liberalization initiatives and 
its willingness to learn from countries once dismissed as "lackeys of west- 
ern imperialism" is a welcome change, it should also be noted that emulat- 
ing success by following in the footsteps of others is neither easy nor a 
guarantee that the pilgrimage will lead to the promised land. Indeed, com- 
parative scholarship shows that East Asia's particular historical, political, 
socioeconomic, and cultural conditions are not easily transferred and that 
the East Asian "model" is not likely to be replicated widely. Therefore, 
sanguine claims by the leading advocates of India's liberalization-who 
include not only converts uch as the finance minister but also the ascen- 
dant academics-cum-technocrats sympathetic to monetarist and neoclassi- 
cal economics now acting as policy interlocutors-that hey are following 
the "time-tested" path of the East Asian NICs, and that India's own "eco- 
nomic miracle" is just around the corner sound surprisingly optimistic.2 
While there is doubtless an element of political calculation and bravado in 
such assertions, I will argue that in large part this optimism stems from an 
incomplete, if not superficial understanding of the East Asian experience. 
Specifically, the pervasive belief that the secret of the East Asian miracle 
was (and is) their market-oriented development strategy is fundamentally 
flawed because it fails to take into account the role of the interventionist 
state in guiding economic development.3 In presenting a more nuanced 
picture of the East Asian experience, this article not only provides a much 
needed corrective to the gaps and the problematic in the Indian debate, but 
also outlines a more balanced set of "lessons" that countries like India can 
draw from the East Asian experience. 
The Balance Sheet 
While on one hand, post-independent India's overall economic perform- 
ance has been impressive when compared to the nearly stagnant growth 
during the colonial period, its record is disappointing when compared to 
growth levels achieved by several other developing countries. For exam- 
ple, India's gross domestic product (GDP) in the manufacturing and in- 
2. For example, see Jagdish Bhagwati, "Is India's Economic Miracle at Hand?" New York 
Times, June 9, 1985; Alan Heston, "India's Economic Reforms: The Real Thing," Current 
History, March 1992. 
3. It is important o note that sophisticated neoclassical analysts do not necessarily neglect 
the role of the state, but tend to view its roles and functions as minimal, approximating those 
prevailing in a free-market situation. The East Asian experience challenges such a view. 
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dustrial sectors stuck at the perennial "Hindu rate of growth" of 3.5% 
during the period 1950-84,4 lagging far behind the "hyper" 9% to 15% 
rates achieved by countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Indonesia, and Thailand. In fact, according to a leading econo- 
mist, India's "share of manufacturing inreal GDP has stagnated at about 
15 % for more than a decade ... and the only sectors that have grown 
relatively rapidly in recent years are public administration and defense."5 
In per capita terms, India's growth rate has also fallen behind. Average 
incomes in South Korea, once roughly equivalent to those in India, are 
currently ten times greater and are more equitably distributed. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that most of India's poor would have been sub- 
stantially better off, even if the benefits of growth were inequitably distrib- 
uted, had India's GDP grown as rapidly as that of South Korea and the 
other NICs. Similarly, India's share of world exports, both commodity 
and manufactured, steadily declined from about 2.5% in the early 1950s to 
less than 0.5% in the late 1980s. While South Korea's exports of manufac- 
tured goods in 1960 were negligible, India exported goods totaling just 
over $600 million; but by the mid-1980s, India's exported industrial goods 
were worth just over $5 billion compared to South Korea's $24.5 billion, 
Hong Kong's $21.9 billion, Singapore's $21.8 billion and China's $22.2 
billion.6 
Eventually, India's laggard economic performance coupled with its 
technologically obsolete, high-cost industry began to impinge severely on 
the national economy causing unprecedented macroeconomic imbalances 
and inflationary pressures with serious, negative reverberations on in- 
comes, domestic interest rates, prices, and the balance of payments. So 
deep were the fiscal problems that despite respectable growth rates in the 
mid-1980s, the real value of incomes was being rapidly eroded by rising 
inflation, and deficit-financing (to offset he decline) by high-cost foreign 
borrowing only made matters worse. By the late 1980s, India's external 
deficit was at a high of 3.4% of its GDP. This was reflected in declining 
foreign exchange reserves that fell to US$1.1 billion-equivalent to about 
4. Even while India's GDP in manufacturing reached an average 5.3% growth in the mid- 
1980s, it still lagged behind the rates recorded by the East Asian NICs. See World Develop- 
ment Report 1991 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1991). 
5. T. N. Srinivasan, "The Economy: Stresses, Strains and Opportunities," in India Brief- 
ing 1988, Marshal Bouton and Philip Oldenburg, eds. (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 
1988), p. 31. 
6. World Bank, World Development Report 1990; Deena Khatkhate, "National Economic 
Policies in India," in National Economic Policies, Dominik Salvatore, ed. (New York: Green- 
wood Press, 1991), pp. 231-76. 
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three weeks of imports-and brought India to the brink of defaulting on 
foreign loans in 1991. 
What Went Wrong and the Way Out 
While there is a growing body of literature providing many explanations 
for India's slow economic growth, and industrial growth in particular,7 
there is general consensus that the current problem is rooted in the early 
post-independence period- the beginning of the planning process.8 The 
proponents of economic liberalization argue that under the guise of 
"planned economic development" the central government, through its 
control of the "commanding heights" of the economy, erected an elaborate 
maze of corporatist structures, quantitative regulations, and "control in- 
struments" until it incrementally permeated all levels of the public and 
private sector, creating one of the most comprehensively controlled and 
regulated economies in the noncommunist world. This "pernicious sys- 
tem," labeled the "license-permit raj" by its critics, was purposely struc- 
tured to facilitate central planning and command mandates rather than 
market responses. It did so by granting arbitrary powers to a hierarchy of 
bureaucrats and politicians, which spawned wasteful rent-seeking activities 
and in the process stifled competition and undermined innovation, produc- 
tion, and efficiency. 
Moreover, policy-induced istortions such as protectionist trade policies 
and overvalued exchange rates and the general impotence of state directed 
macroeconomic policies contributed to industrial concentration and stag- 
nation, allowing the state and vested interests not only to capture a dispro- 
portionate share of the public largess and profits but also to divert and 
waste scarce resources on speculative ventures and unproductive activities. 
Jagdish Bhagwati, one of the leading advocates of liberalization, aptly 
sums up the sad legacy of India's regulatory state: 
7. See Isher J. Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India: Stagnation Since the Mid-Sixties 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985); Pranab Bardhan, The Political Economy of 
Development in India (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); M.R. Bhagavan, "A Critique of In- 
dia's Economic Policies and Strategies," Monthly Review, July 1987; P.N. Dhar, Constraints 
on Growth: Reflections on the Indian Experience (New Delhi: Institute of Economic Growth, 
1990); Bimal Jalan, India's Economic Crisis: The Way Ahead (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1991); Baldev Raj Nayar, India's Mixed Economy: The Role of Ideology and Interest 
in its Development (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1989); I.J. Patel, "On Taking India into the 
Twenty-First Century," Modern Asian Studies, 21:2 (1987), and "New Economic Policies: A 
Historical Perspective," Economic and Political Weekly 27:1 (January 1992). 
8. Even prominent central planners like Bimal Jalan, who have been at the center of In- 
dia's financial bureaucracy for some three decades, now admit to this. In India's Economic 
Crisis, Jamal writes that they "did not pay adequate attention to the real determinants of state 
action, nor to the economic consequences of excessive bureaucratic intervention" (p. 11). 
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The Indian regime of controls spawned its own interests. The entire society it 
yielded, with entrepreneurs enjoying squatter ights, created a business class 
that wanted liberalization i the sense of less hassle, not genuine competition. 
The bureaucrats . .. could not but have noticed that this regime gave them the 
enormous power that the ability to confer ents generates. The politics of cor- 
ruption also followed as politicians became addicted to the use of licensing to 
generate illegal funds for election and for themselves. The iron triangle of busi- 
ness, bureaucrats, and politicians was born around the regime.9 
The champions of economic reform argue that in order to escape the 
deleterious effects of central planning and modernize India's economy, the 
government's sphere should be reduced to the minimum, and that autarkic 
regulations, bureaucratic controls, and diktats be replaced by market 
mechanisms. Specifically, the call is for: 
* liberalization fthe economy in order to allow production, prices, interest 
rates, and wages to find their "natural equilibrium" through the interaction f
supply and demand; 
* deregulation ffinancial markets and the opening up of restricted sectors of 
the economy to private investment; 
* the dismantling ofrestrictive legislation such as direct and indirect taxation; 
* the privatization f state-owned nterprises (SOE) and the liquidation of non- 
viable ("sick") firms and SOEs; 
* complete dismantling ofthe industrial licensing system and foreign exchange 
controls. 
Such a market-conforming, export-oriented, outward-looking strategy, the 
reformers argue, will enable the economy to move toward an equilibrium, 
i.e., balanced, growth path in which patterns of production, investment, 
and capacity creation follow dynamic comparative advantage and thereby 
minimize resource costs, increase competition in domestic markets, and 
eliminate potential channels of corruption. Indeed, in spite of the half- 
hearted nature of economic liberalization in India, many features of these 
new reform policies have already been introduced, especially by the 
Narasimha Rao administration. 
Neoclassical Political Economy 
and East Asia 
As noted earlier, these arguments for economic liberalization and market- 
oriented reforms have been motivated in no small measure by a particular 
reading of the East Asian experience. According to the advocates of In- 
dia's liberalization, East Asia's economies "took off" because the "mini- 
9. Jagdish Bhagwati, "Poverty and Public Policy," World Development 5 (May 1988), p. 
36. 
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malist states" employed only limited fiscal or monetary instruments and 
followed consistent and coherent market-conforming policies such as trade 
liberalization, devaluation, a pragmatic stance toward foreign direct in- 
vestment, and a willingness to allow international market forces to deter- 
mine price relativities (including exchange rate adjustments). Thus, they 
were able to offset externalities and ensure that resources would be utilized 
efficiently and allocated in accordance with the principles of comparative 
advantage. The reform advocates point out that South Korea and Taiwan, 
whose economic structures were once typical of many developing coun- 
tries, by following market signals were able to make the shift from import- 
substitution industrialization (ISI) in the 1950s and 1960s to export-pro- 
motion by the late 1960s. Countries like India, on the other hand, follow- 
ing orders from managers of the command economy, only aggravated 
economic distortions, turning businesses and industries into pro-protec- 
tionist lobbies and entrenching rent-seeking activities. To the reformers, 
the East Asian NICs are a living example of how the benign "invisible 
hand" of the market can enhance economic growth with efficiency and 
equity simultaneously. 
However, comparative studies, including those by scholars sympathetic 
to neoclassical claims,10 reveal that East Asia's rapid economic growth 
and the relatively egalitarian pattern of income distribution cannot be at- 
tributed to market-oriented policies alone, but rather rests as well on a 
combination of peculiar initial conditions and strategic government inter- 
ventions. First, the smooth transition from ISI to export promotion was 
not simply the result of market signals, but benefited from an earlier period 
of business and entrepreneurial maturation which dated back to the pre- 
1945 period under the Japanese in Korea and Taiwan.11 
Second, while it is true that, with the exception of Hong Kong, East 
Asia's impressive performance with respect to income equity is due to its 
rapid expansion in labor-absorbing, export-oriented manufacturing indus- 
tries, it should be noted that the socioeconomic structure and patterns of 
income distribution i  South Korea and Taiwan were relatively egalitarian 
even before the transition to export-led growth. This was due in large part 
10. For example, Leroy Jones and I. Sakong, Government, Business and Entrepreneurship 
in Economic Development: The Korean Case (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); 
Sung-Tae Ro, "National Economic Policies in Newly Industrialized Countries," in National 
Economic Policies, Dominik Salvatore, ed. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), pp. 
171-204. 
11. See discussion by Bruce Cumings, "The Origins and Development of the Northeast 
Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles and Political Consequences," in 
The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, Frederic C. Deyo, ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1987). 
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to the extensive business/commercial restructuring and agrarian reforms 
that were undertaken in these countries in the 1950s.12 Third, what the 
neoclassical accounts most frequently overlook is that the activist East 
Asian states went far beyond the prescribed neutral policy advocated by 
these theorists. The market-oriented policies were accompanied by strate- 
gic state intervention that complemented and directed rather than negated 
market forces. 
Specifically, despite variations in the pattern of state intervention, in 
each case the East Asian states through discrete and targeted interventions 
created an environment supportive of market forces. For example, in the 
early phase the state acted as a surrogate for missing capital markets by 
procuring domestic savings and foreign investment and protecting infant 
domestic industries, and later it played a key role in identifying potentially 
lucrative niches within the global economy and orchestrating with alacrity 
incentives to encourage domestic firms and export cartels to invest and 
modernize. Moreover, by following market signals, the state was able to 
respond (often preemptively) to externalities, provide crucial market infor- 
mation, and broker relations with foreign investors and creditors. 
By assuming a catalytic role in the areas of information processing and 
technology acquisition, the state was able to foster local mastery, rather 
than simply transfer of modern technologies, and throughout he different 
stages of modernization it provided the infrastructure n eded by industry 
and business. Finally, by heavily investing in education (especially voca- 
tional training), it created a technically skilled and disciplined labor force, 
which is indispensable to economic modernization and export-promotion 
in particular. 
The Developmental State and Economic Development 
Comparative scholarship has shown that capitalist modernization has his- 
torically required some sort of an alliance between the state and the emerg- 
ing bourgeois classes, and particularly in the case of "late bloomers." 
Alexander Gerschenkron in his classic Economic Backwardness in Histori- 
cal Perspective pointed out that "late industrializers" confronting an estab- 
lished, competitive, and hegemonic international industrial order faced 
complex problems of economic development and hence required direct 
state intervention to overcome political and economic impediments. In 
Germany, for instance, industrialization was spearheaded by an alliance 
12. Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in
East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); G. Ranis 
and S.W. Kuo, Growth with Equity: The Taiwan Case (London: Oxford University Press, 
1979). 
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led by a strong "interventionist ate" and private banking and industrial 
capital. In this setting, the state not only harnessed the resources for in- 
dustrialization but also assumed firm political control over the dominant 
economic interests and a directive, coordinating role in economic manage- 
ment and decision-making. Similarly, Chalmers Johnson in his path- 
breaking study on MITI provides an excellent account of an "autonomous 
developmental state" in action. According to Johnson, the Japanese 
state's "embedded autonomy" exemplified by its institutionalized and cen- 
tralized decision-making structures, its emphasis on "performance" and 
"plan-rational" technocratic solutions, and the "existence of a powerful, 
talented, and prestige-laden economic bureaucracy" allowed the state to 
act as a surrogate for weak indigenous capitalism, set "substantive social 
and economic goals," and implement a strategy of development based on 
"industrial rationalization."13 
The "embedded autonomy" of the Chiang regime in Taiwan and the 
Park and Chun regimes in South Korea enabled them also to achieve a 
relatively high degree of insulation from the dominant interests in civil 
society. According to specialists analyzing these developmental states,14 
an elaborate corporatist organization of interest groups-a strategy that 
granted considerable operational space to market-oriented technocrats- 
cum-policy elites and allowed paternalistic ollaboration with powerful 
business interests in the private sector-enabled these states to pursue 
market-conforming methods of state intervention i  the economy without 
precipitating organized opposition from powerful vested interests. More- 
over, their well-trained, efficient, and "meritocratic bureaucracy," a prod- 
uct of the "hard" state's "business-like" institutional nd decision-making 
structures, reduced intrabureaucratic logrolling and conflict, while the cor- 
porate control of labor enabled the state to co-opt and subordinate groups 
from the popular sector. 
More recently, Robert Wade has provided new insights into these is- 
sues.15 In sharp contrast to neoclassical accounts, Wade articulates an 
alternative or "governed market" theory that argues it is the "pragmatic 
synergy" between East Asian governments and markets that explains their 
economic and developmental success. Focusing on Taiwan, but with com- 
parisons to South Korea, Japan, and Hong Kong, Wade provides detailed 
accounts of how these states have utilized their policy instruments to 
maintain macroeconomic growth and stability and spearhead export-pro- 
moting industrialization. Painstakingly tracing the states' role in different 
13. Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 
1925-1975 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982), esp. pp. 17-18, 25. 
14. Frederic C. Deyo, ed., Political Economy. 
15. Robert Wade, Governing the Market. 
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industries and sectors over time, Wade shows how East Asian govern- 
ments encouraged both high levels and sectoral composition of investment 
that could not have been supplied by the market. He provides a detailed 
account of the "trade regime"-the core of the neoclassical account of ex- 
port-led growth-arguing that although exporters enjoyed a free trade re- 
gime for inputs, the domestic market for final products was protected by 
governmental regulations well into the mid-1980s, and that exporters were 
granted supports that went far beyond a favorable xchange rate. Through 
case studies and exhaustive reviews of the instruments of government pol- 
icy, Wade vividly demonstrates how market-guided state intervention has 
been central to the economic success of East Asia. These interventions 
included mobilizing domestic and foreign savings for "productive invest- 
ments," targeting lucrative niches within the global economy, providing 
incentives to ensure technological and financial innovations, and deliber- 
ately responding to market signals in order to allow firms to minimize risk 
and exploit comparative advantage. 
The Lessons for India 
This review of the East Asian experience provides some useful lessons for 
India and other countries attempting economic reform. Most notably, 
market-oriented development and state intervention must be viewed as 
complementary rather than competing or contradictory. The East Asian 
cases suggest that an efficiently functioning market economy rests criti- 
cally on the provision of a working political-institutional context: a calcu- 
lable law and administration to guarantee property rights and contract; a
cohesive and insulated decision-making structure backed by a differenti- 
ated, specialized, and competent bureaucracy; a physical infrastructure of
transport and communication links with domestic and global markets; and 
sustained government investment in human capital, namely health, wel- 
fare, and education, to guarantee a skilled and productive work force. 
Thus, the major task for many low-income countries is not simply to 
improve incentives through the market mechanism by reducing the role of 
the state, but also to augment and strengthen the efficacy of state institu- 
tions so that they can maintain an enabling environment and assume a 
directive and coordinating role in economic life. Such a "developmental 
state" will have the institutional capacity to provide macroeconomic sta- 
bility and supply the public goods that allow a market economy to emerge 
and function in the first place. Furthermore, it is not clear that a drastic 
reduction of the state's role in the economy will automatically produce 
greater efficiency and enhance economic performance. In India, and in- 
deed in many parts of the developing world, there exists a high degree of 
interdependence between the public and private sectors. Arbitrary and 
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rash deregulation or privatization in the absence of viable alternatives will 
only exacerbate socioeconomic dislocations. 
This call for state involvement should not be misinterpreted as an en- 
dorsement of indiscriminate r gulation and intervention. What really mat- 
ters is not the extent but the quality of state intervention. Here it is 
appropriate to ask why the interventionist Indian state, which also acted as 
a demiurge, failed to produce the economic achievements of the East 
Asian NICs. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the answer has little to do 
with democratic versus authoritarian rule, but rather with the complex 
relationship between states and markets. While the Indian state continued 
to expand its role as regulator, producer, and distributor throughout he 
1960s and 1970s, including sheltering both public and private sector pro- 
ducers from market competition, the South Korean and Taiwanese states 
were using the leverage they gained from control over financial flows to 
encourage market competition. They expanded export-processing zones 
and private sector investment, for example, by providing incentives to 
firms and individuals to invest in stock ownership in privatized state firms, 
while at the same time removing the state from speculative and unproduc- 
tive economic activities. 
In the end, India's strategy of import substitution, rather than a policy 
of protecting infant industries, was a way of protecting inefficient and mo- 
nopolistic producers. Moreover, the Indian state in adopting what Jagdish 
Bhagwati has aptly termed a "proscriptive conomic regime,"1'6 quite un- 
like the "prescriptive policies" of the economically successful East Asian 
countries, failed to direct the economy via market signals. Proscriptive 
policies not only grant politicians and bureaucrats the power to say no to 
most private initiatives, they also provide opportunities for self-aggran- 
dizement by spawning quasi-monopoly rents (in the form of political con- 
tributions and black money), licenses, and built-in inefficiencies. Hence, it 
is the quality of state intervention a d selectivity in targeting that separates 
the Indian state from the East Asian NICs. 
Finally, the East Asian experience suggests that if the fruits of market- 
oriented growth are to have positive effects on redistribution a d poverty 
alleviation, extensive state commitment and intervention are required. 
The neoclassical prescription of relying on the "Pareto Optimum" is un- 
tenable since under imperfect conditions, the market equilibrium is in gen- 
eral not Pareto efficient. As Amartya Sen has aptly noted, "a state can be 
Pareto optimal with some people in extreme misery and others rolling in 
luxury. " 17 
16. Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
17. Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 32. 
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Similarly, the claim by some neoclassical analysts that economic liber- 
alism and political democracy are incompatible and therefore conomi- 
cally liberalizing but politically authoritarian regimes are required (and 
justified) to achieve certain developmental objectives, is not only problem- 
atic but unacceptable on both normative and practical grounds.18 First, 
there is no clear correlation between "regime type" and economic perform- 
ance, and in the case of India any type of authoritarian rule will only exac- 
erbate the problems of governability. 19 Yet, market-conforming economic 
reforms mean the elimination of subsidies, the phasing out of price and 
wage controls, and in general an overall reduction in the state's distribu- 
tive intervention in the economy. All these "bitter medicine" measures 
mean enduring more pain, socioeconomic dislocation, and a rise in social 
and political tensions. In such an environment, democratic regimes with 
their legitimate authority can most effectively mediate between the con- 
flicting factions within civil society, especially between capital and labor. 
This irony, what Miles Kahler calls the "orthodox paradox,"20 means that 
for governments o reduce their role in the economy and expand the arena 
of market forces, the state itself must first be strengthened. 
18. The most forceful exponent of this view is D. Lal, The Hindu Equilibrium: Cultural 
Stability and Economic Stagnation, India c. 1550 B. C -A.D. 1980 (London: Clarendon Press, 
1988). However, similar conclusions have been reached by some Marxist scholars, e.g., G. 
O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American 
Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1973). 
19. It has been convincingly argued that in India, economic performance has been only 
marginally affected by the type of regime in power. See Lloyd H. Rudolph and Susanne H. 
Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State (Chicago: Chi- 
cago University Press, 1987); also, Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing 
Crisis of Governability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
20. Miles Kahler, "Orthodoxy and its Alternatives: Explaining Approaches to Stabiliza- 
tion and Adjustment," in Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in 
the Third World, Joan Nelson, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 55. 
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